20 DEC 2020 - CC-17 Rock and a Hard Place

MrBean · Post by **MrBean** » Mon Dec 14, 2020 8:54 am

MISSION OVERVIEW

DATE: 20 December 2020

TIME: 08:00

TASK: Warehouse facility strike

WX: 320@08KT 14,000OVC T03 Q29.86

SUNRISE: 08:25
SUNSET: 18:11

FLIGHT DURATION: 70 minutes / 340nm

AVAILABLE SQUADRON ASSETS:
Dealer 1: 4 x F/A-18c
Dealer 2: 4 x F/A-18c
Dealer 3: 4 x F/A-18c
Dealer 4: 4 x F/A-18c
Dealer 1-4: 3 x F-14b

CARRIER:
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN-71) / BRC 330° / Freq 127.5 [7] / TCN 71X "THR" / ICLS: 11

SUPPORTING UNITS:
AWACS / E-2D / OVERLORD / Freq 266.000 [4]
Mission Tanker / KC135MPRS / TEXACO / Freq 231.00 [5] / TCN:55X
Recovery Tanker / S-3B / SHELL / Freq 351.00 [6] / TCN:56X

SPECOPS Team / DIRTYBIRD / Freq 266.00
READY 5 CAP / 4x F-14B / FORD / Freq 266.00

DIVERT:
Kobuleti
Rwy: 7/25
TCN: 67X
ATC: 262.0

BULLSEYE: N 41 55.847 E 041 51.702 / Kobuleti (WP15/WP8)

SITUATION

In the wake of Abkhazia’s failed chemical weapons program, the UN has initiated an arms embargo and maintains close scrutiny of all cargo arriving in Abkhazi port facilities and airports. Regardless, the Abkhazian separatist army remains extremely well supplied in their continued skirmishes with Georgia.

Word was received via Russian and Abkhazi informants that the Abkhazian Army is secretly obtaining arms and ammunition resupply from the Russians at a warehousing facility near the remote village of Akytara, located high in the mountains on the Abkhazia-Russia border.

Acting on this information, a British SAS team (callsign: DIRTYBIRD) was inserted into the area to locate and observe any activity at this rumored facility. The existence of the facility was confirmed and it has been under surveillance by the SPECOPS team for several days. They reported that supplies are indeed being transported across the Russian border via helicopter, stockpiled, and subsequently loaded into trucks for distribution southwards to various Abkhazi Army strongholds.

MISSION

VFA-41 has been ordered to strike and destroy this remote warehousing and distribution facility. Dealer flight 1 (and 4 if desired) has been earmarked and routed for the strike. Dealer flights 2 and 3 have been earmarked and routed for SEAD and/or CAP duties as assigned by the Mission Commander.

This is only our second planned overflight of hostile Abkhazian territory. As we learned the first time, successful execution of the mission will require a SEAD effort in advance of the strike package in order to shut down the SA-2 site located on the coast adjacent to the Sukhumi airport (SEAD WP6), as well as a coastal early warning radar located a few miles SE of the town/airport of Gudauta (SEAD WP5). Elimination of these assets should allow the strike package to remain undetected until they go feet-dry.

The target facility is located in extremely difficult terrain. It lies in a small cirque that is bordered on three sides by ~7,500’ ridgelines (the rock). Additionally, the ridgeline located approximately one mile NW of the target marks the Abkhazia-Russia border and must not be crossed in the execution of this mission (the hard place).

Airwing targeteers have determined that the surrounding terrain makes use of standoff munitions impossible for this mission.

Additionally, due to the target’s close proximity to the Russian border, precision laser or GPS guided iron bombs would require the strike package to ingress at an altitude and speed that risks being mistaken by the Russians as a strike inbound to their territory- and would place the strike package at great risk; not to mention encouraging even more interference from the Russians than has already plagued our operations in the AOR to this point.

Therefore, a low-level ingress route from offshore with unguided bombs has been charted that will keep the main strike package below Russian radar coverage until reaching the target. The route will ingress from the Abkhazi coast near the town of Sukhumi then follow the Gumistu and Bavia River valleys north then westward to the target area.

Approaching the IP (Strike WP10), the strike flight can pull sharply up over the final ridgeline into a pop up CCIP attack on the target (Strike WP11), which will be located at their approximate 12:30 to 1:00 position as they top the final ridge at the IP.

Note: The SPECOPS team will launch a red mortar smoke round to mark the target in order to aid with target acquisition.

AFTER WEAPONS RELEASE strike flight aircraft must execute a hard left turn to approximately 150 degrees in order to avoid crossing into Russian airspace. DO NOT DELAY the turn to observe your bomb hits – the Brits will assess and provide BDA on egress.

Once clear of the target area, the strike flight will egress to the SW via Strike WP12 and the Bzipi River valley back to the coast.

Once the coastal defenses are eliminated, SEAD and CAP flights should stand by just offshore, or inland near the coast, and patrol for any additional threats that develop. Again, aircraft at altitude unnecessarily pushing too far inland towards the Russian border may draw unwanted attention from the Russians.

Other pertinent/helpful notes:

- This mission launches at dawn in order to take advantage of an advantageous sun angle from the East in the target area. Given the low level ingress, the strike flight should hold if needed and not push past WP2 until 08:35 in order to ensure sufficient illumination along the ingress route. This should also afford time for the SEAD/CAP flight(s) to clear their assigned targets

- Assuming a strike ingress at ~500AGL and ~400KTS, estimated fuel burn for strike flight aircraft from push point to coast-out is 4,200#. Strike flight leader(s) should give consideration to topping off at TEXACO prior to ingress while waiting for their push time.

- Strike flight(s) should have sufficient protection from ground and airborne search radars provided they approach the coast at low level and then stay within the selected ingress/egress valleys until reaching the IP and commencing their bombing run. The ingress route crosses one 6500’ ridgeline between WP5 and WP6 and aircraft ballooning too high while cresting the ridge may be briefly detectable by Russian radars.

THREATS

As previously stated, the SA-2 site near Sukhumi and the Gudauta EWR site will need to be taken out as they threaten the strike ingress route.

The other known Abkhazi SA-2 site to the SE, near Ochamchira, should pose no immediate threat to this operation, but can be engaged if required.

Abkhazia possesses several other mobile air defense assets (SA-13, SA-11 SA-8, ZSU-23) that are continually on the move and whose precise locations are unknown. Be on the lookout for any additional air defenses that activate once the strike is underway.

Fortunately, DIRTYBIRD reports no mobile SAM or heavy AAA in the strike target area. Threats over target will be limited to small arms fire and possible Manpads.

Once alerted to the presence of the inbound strike package, air response by the Abkhazi A/F out of Gudauta and/or Sukhumi airfields should be expected.

Air defenses to the north in Russian airspace are numerous and formidable. Again, extreme care should be taken not to inadvertently stray into Russian territory or a strong SAM and airborne response is likely.

ROE

In keeping with the recently issued ROE update the following apply:

Once the mission is underway, any Abkhazian air defenses or aircraft originating from an Abkhazi airfield (Gudauta or Sukhumi) will be within 40nm of Navy strike fighter aircraft and may be engaged.

Aircraft or ground defenses located in or originating from Russian airspace must still demonstrate hostile intent (radar lock or weapon launch) or cross into Georgian/Abkhazian airspace before being engaged.

A flight of F-14Bs (FORD flight) will be on Ready 5 duty and will launch automatically to intercept any aircraft closing within 60 miles of the CSG.

VFA-41’s primary responsibility is to conduct and support the warehouse facility strike. Should the Russians involve themselves and the prospect of a protracted air-to-air engagement develop or look likely, Dealer flight leaders will be given the ability to request launch of the Ready 5 Tomcats for assistance covering strike package egress; and should then make every effort to extricate themselves from the situation and RTB.